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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
court could undertake a further experiment. At the second phase of
trial, the jury could be instructed on the factors which would lead to a
finding of diminished capacity. Only then would they fix the degree of
offense. Should they find, for example, that the defendant was incapable
of forming the specific intent to kill, the verdict would be second degree
murder. No significant duplication of judicial effort would be involved,
and no repetition of expert testimony would be required.
CHARLES 0. PEED, JR.
Criminal Procedure-Probable Cause and Due Process at Sentencing
The guilt determination process in the American judicial system is
characterized by rigorous procedural and evidentiary standards and ex-
tensive appellate review designed to ferret out the slightest harmful
error. The criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial is
assured by specific procedural guarantees in the Bill of Rights as well
as by the broader fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process of
law. But once guilt is established, all these procedural safeguards seem
to vanish. Although the Supreme Court has said that the sentencing
process is subject to scrutiny under the due process clause,' the extension
of procedural due process safeguards to sentencing has been the excep-
tion rather than the rule.' Furthermore, there is normally no substantive
review of sentences in federal appellate courts,3 and the vast discretion
of the sentencing judge remains largely unfettered. This note will exam-
ine the criminal defendant's rights during sentencing and will discuss a
case that significantly extends presently recognized due process safe-
guards surrounding the sentencing process.
Recently in United States v. Weston4 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed the information considered in sentencing a criminal
defendant, vacated the sentence, and remanded, holding that "the Dis-
'See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 n.18 (1949).
2See Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REV. 821,
824-25 (1968).
3See Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences, 15
VAND. L. REV. 671 (1962); ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCE 13-15 (Approved Draft 1968). At
present fifteen states make appellate review of sentences available on a regular basis. Id. at 13.
1448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971).
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trict Court may not rely upon the information contained in the present-
ence report unless it is amplified by information such as to be persuasive
of the validity of the charges there made."5
Janice Weston was convicted of knowingly receiving, concealing,
and facilitating the transportation of illegally imported heroin. The trial
judge initially indicated that the minimum mandatory sentence of five
years would be appropriate, but upon request of the prosecutor the judge
agreed to have a presentence report prepared before imposing sentence.'
The report contained charges that the defendant was one of the largest
distributors of naroctics in the state and that she went to Mexico as
often as once every two weeks to obtain drugs. The trial judge imposed
the maximum sentence of twenty years on the basis of the report and
then, because of the severity of the sentence, examined the information
upon which the report was based. This consisted principally of an un-
sworn memorandum in which a narcotics agent quoted a named inform-
ant who had said that on one occasion the defendant was preparing to
go to Mexico. The trial judge determined that without a reasonable
doubt the presentence report was substantiated by such factual informa-
tion.
The court of appeals, which also examined the confidential memo-
randum, did not object to the consideration in sentencing of criminal
conduct of which the defendant has been neither formally accused nor
convicted;7 however, the court did object to the use of virtually unsup-
ported allegations of such criminal conduct. The court denounced the
use of an unsworn, unverified statement of an informer who had not
been shown to be reliable and the fact that the memorandum did not
corroborate the broad charges made in the report.8
At common law the criminal defendant had two rights at sentenc-
Vd. at 634.
61d. at 627-28. Preparation of the presentence report is controlled by FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(l),
which states:
The probation service of the court shall make a presentence investigation and report
to the court before the imposition of sentence or the granting of probation unless the
court otherwise directs. The report shall not be submitted to the court or its contents
disclosed to anyone unless the defendant has pleaded guilty or has been found guilty.
7448 F.2d at 633. Contra, Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1968), in which
the court set a rule for the circuit that "[n]o conviction or criminal charge should be included in
the report, or considered by the court, unless referable to an official record." The American Bar
Association has suggested that all arrests and other dispositions short of adjudication should be
excluded from the presentence report. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
PROBATION 37 (Approved Draft 1970).
1448 F.2d at 630.
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ing-the right to be present when sentence was pronounced,9 and the
right of allocution. 0 Since virtually all crimes were felonies at common
law, and all felonies were punishable by execution and attainder, the
trial judge had only ritual duties at sentencing." Nineteenth century
penal reform brought about a change from the absolute, legislatively
fixed penalty to penalties expressed in statutory minimum and maxi-
mum terms of imprisonment. 12 This concept of individually tailored
sentences, determined by the presence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, gives the trial judge vast discretion as to both the appro-
priate sentence and the relevant criteria that provide the basis for his
determination. This rehabilitative approach to penology demands that
the sentencing judge be apprised of the background of the defendant.
The modern tool for achieving this result is the presentence report-a
report based on an investigation conducted by probation officers or
social workers.'" Reform movements gave the trial judge greater discre-
'Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892) (after indictment nothing can be done in
the absence of the defendant; this right cannot be waived in a felony). In North Carolina the
defendant has the right to be present throughout all stages of the trial. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18,
formerly N.C. CONST. art. I, § 35 (1868), cited in State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 330, 126 S.E.2d
126, 129 (1962), noted in 41 N.C.L. REV. 260 (1963). FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 states in part:
The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial
including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition
of sentence, except as otherwise provided by these rules. In prosecutions for offenses not
punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence after the trial has been comm-
enced in his presence shall not prevent continuing the trial to and including the return
of the verdict.
Several lower federal courts have cited United States v. Behrens, 375 U.S. 162 (1963) in
holding that imposition of sentence in the absence of the defendant was in violation of procedural
due process. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 346 F.2d 428, 429-30 (4th Cir. 1965). However,
the decision in Behrens was based only on rule 43, as is made clear by Mr. Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion: "Whether or not the Constitution would permit any other procedure it is not
now necessary to decide." 375 U.S. at 168.
"Although technically "allocution is the formal address of the trial court to the prisoner as
the prisoner stands at the bar for sentence .... " the term is generally used today to mean the
implied right to reply. Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo. L. REV. 115, 115-16 (1944). For a good discussion
of the common law right of allocution and a survey of state law, see id. (pts. 1-2), at 115, 232.
"Barrett, supra note 10, at 119; Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal:
The View from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1968).
"Note, 81 HARV. L. REV., supra note 2, at 822.
"For a discussion of the functions, objectives, and preparation of the presentence report, see
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION
REPORT (Pub. No. 103, 1965); for a survey of state practices, see ABA PROJECT FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 200-04 (Ap-
proved Draft 1968). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-198 (1965) provides for optional presentence investiga-
tions before sentencing. See State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 334-35, 126 S.E.2d 126, 133 (1962)
(presentence investigations are encouraged).
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tion, but there was no corresponding growth of procedural or substan-
tive safeguards against judicial error or prejudice.
It was in this milieu of almost total discretion in the trial courts
and no procedural safeguards for the convicted defendant that the Su-
preme Court began to scrutinize the sentencing process for the possibili-
ties of prejudice. In Townsend v. Burke,'4 an unrepresented defendant
had been sentenced on the basis of a misreading of court records because
of the judge's apparent failure to distinguish between prior arrests and
prior convictions. The Supreme Court held that the resulting sentence
was in violation of due process of law, but the Court failed to make it
clear whether the absence of counsel, the materially untrue assumptions,
or their juxtaposition violated due process.'5 Recently, however, the
Supreme Court cited Townsend for the sole holding that due process is
denied a defendant who is sentenced on the basis of materially untrue
assumptions about his prior criminal record." This reading of Townsend
provided the basis for the Weston decision. The Weston court said that
it was extending Townsend only slightly in holding that information
used in sentencing must meet standards of probable accuracy as well as
be probative of charges against the defendant. 7 Although the Weston
court never specifically indicated that its decision was required by the
due process clause, both the general language of the opinion and the
doctrinal support of Townsend indicate that this is a consistent reading
of the case. Other lower federal courts have extended the reasoning of
Townsend, holding that the defendant has a right to be sentenced on the
basis of complete information, and have remanded for preparation of a
presentence report and resentencing.' 8
One year after Townsend, in a decision thought by some writers to
have retarded the movement started by Townsend toward giving the
defendant greater protection at sentencing,' 9 the Supreme Court in
Williams v. New York20 held that the trial judge was not restricted in
the sources and kinds of information he may use in determining sent-
"334 U.S. 736 (1948).
"Id. at 740-41.
"United States v. Tucker, 92 S. Ct. 589, 592 (1972).
"1448 F.2d at 634.
"E.g., Leach v. United States, 353 F.2d 451, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 917
(1966), noted in 74 YALE L.J. 379 (1964).
"Pugh & Carver, Due Process and Sentencing: From Mapp to Mempa to McGautha, 49 TEX.
L. REv. 25, 29 (1970).
-337 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1949).
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ence.21 The defendant's principal contention was that he had a right to
disclosure of the information and to cross-examine the sources of the
information. The Court did not rule on his disclosure argument, pre-
sumably because the sentencing judge voluntarily disclosed the informa-
tion, but held that due process does not assure the defendant the right
to confront and cross-examine the sources of the information.2
The Court emphasized the need for efficient collection of informa-
tion for sentencing and explained its decision on two grounds. First,
both English and American judicial history indicated that at common
law the sentencing judges were free to consider any information in
determining sentence. Secondly, the Court feared that to extend the
traditional due process safeguards to sentencing would turn sentencing
into a second trial with the consequence of preventing all courts "from
making progressive efforts to improve the administration of criminal
justice. '24
The Weston court distinguished Williams because there the defen-
dant had failed to object to consideration of the burglary charges in
determining sentence on the grounds that they were not true. His objec-
tion was that the charges had not been introduced in a trial-type hearing.
Janice Weston, on the other hand, not only denied the accuracy of the
charges but also objected to their consideration without further substan-
tiation. 25
In 1967 the Supreme Court held in Mempa v. Rhay5 that every
defendant has a right to counsel at sentencing, a "critical stage" in the
criminal trial. Unfortunately, however, the extension of due process
safeguards at sentencing has been left largely to the lower federal
courts.21 One issue frequently raised is whether the defendant has a right
to see the presentence report.2 At present the Federal Rules of Criminal
2 Accord, State v. Thompson, 267 N.C. 653, 655, 148 S.E.2d 613, 615 (1966).
2337 U.S. at 250-51.
2Id. at 246.
11ld. at 251.
2448 F.2d at 631. The dissenting judge in Weston thought that the majority holding was a
repudiation of the rule of Williams. Id. at 634.
26389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
"Although the Court in Williams refused to extend the traditional due process safeguards of
confrontation and cross-examination to sentencing, a footnote indicates that the decision is not to
be read broadly: "What we have said is not to be accepted as a holding that the sentencing
procedure is immune from scrutiny under the due process clause. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S.
736." 337 U.S. at 252 n.18.
"Guzman, Defendant's Access to Presentence Reports in Federal Criminal Courts, 52 IOWA
L. REv. 161, 163-64 (1966).
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Procedure leave disclosure entirely in the discretion of the trial judge.20
Many writers feel that one logical and necessary implication of
Townsend is that unless counsel is allowed to inspect the report, he will
be unable to ensure that the defendant is not sentenced on the basis of
materially untrue assumptions .3  Although commentators contend that
the Supreme Court has implicitly recognized a constitutional basis for
the right of disclosure, the Court has not expressly so held.3' Janice
Weston was fortunate to have the opportunity to read the presentence
report, for disclosure is generally denied in the federal courts.32
27The report of the presentence investigation shall contain any prior criminal record
of the defendant and such information about his characteristics, his financial condition
and the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sentence or
in granting probation or in the correctional treatment of the defendant, and such other
information as may be required by the court. The court before imposing sentence may
disclose to the defendant or his counsel all or part of the material contained in the re-
port of the presentence investigation and afford an opportunity to the defendant or his
counsel to comment thereon. Any material disclosed to the defendant or his counsel shall
also be disclosed to the attorney for the government.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2) (emphasis added).
10E.g., Guzman, supra note 28, at 174. In support of the argument that right to counsel
requires the right of disclosure, some writers rely partially on the general language of Oyler v.
Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 452 (1962), a case in which a defendant was sentenced without notice under
a recidivist statute: "[I]t would [be] an idle accomplishment to say that due process requires counsel
but not the right to reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard." For further discussion, see
Pugh & Carver, supra note 19, at 41.
3 The case most frequently cited to support the argument for indirect recognition of this
constitutional right is Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). There the Supreme Court held
that under the governing statute in the District of Columbia, a juvenile "was entitled to a hearing,
including access by his counsel to the social records and probation or similar reports" before the
juvenile court could waive jurisdiction. Id. at 557. The Court further characterized the failure of
the juvenile bourt to provide the petitioner with a hearing as failure to act with "procedural
regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process
and fairness." Id. at 553 (dictum); see Katkin, Presentence Reports: An Analysis of Uses. Limita-
tions and Civil'Liberties Issues, 55 MINN. L. REv. 15, 26-29 (1970).
In Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 606 (1967), the Supreme Court characterized Williams
as holding "that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a judge
to have hearings and to give a convicted person an opportunity to participate in those hearings
when he came to determine the sentence to be imposed." Although such a broad reading of
Williams seems to weaken significantly any argument for disclosure and the opportunity to rebut,
there are several indications that Williams is no bar to the assertion that due process must require
these safeguards at sentencing. The portion of the Williams opinion referred to in Patterson deals
with the impossibility of gathering information if the judge were restricted to information received
in open court, and therefore it is arguable that the hearings referred to by the Court included the
procedural safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination. This narrow reading of Williams
is also supported by the facts of the case and the issues raised by the defendant.
2See Note, The Presentence Report: An Empirical Study of Its Use in the Federal Criminal
Process, 58 GEO. L.J. 451, 474 (1970). See also United States v. Bryant, 442 F.2d 775, 776 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (abuse of discretion for trial judge to have uniform policy of nondisclosure).
[Vol. 50
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Another implication to be drawn from this line of cases is that the
defendant has the right to rebut adverse information. Although rule
32(a)(1)33 gives the defendant the opportunity to present personally
any information in mitigation of punishment, the Supreme Court has
held that failure of the trial judge to ask the defendant if he had anything
to say before sentence was imposed was neither a constitutional error
nor "an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair
procedure.'34 However, the Court has pointed out that it has never
decided whether it would be a violation of due process affirmatively to
deny the defendant an opportunity to speak in mitigation of punish-
ment.35 But even this limited right will prove to be of substantial value
to the defendant only when there is disclosure of the information used
in sentencing.
The Anglo-American system of justice traditionally has relied upon
However, the principal arguments against disclosure-that informational sources would dry
up if the report were not kept confidential and that disclosure would unjustifiably extend sentenc-
ing-have now been discredited, and the 1970 proposed changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide for mandatory disclosure of the factual information to be used in determining
sentence. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, 48 F.R.D. 553, 614-15 (1970). A good summary of arguments for and against disclo-
sure is found in id. at 618 (Advisory Committee Note). Although the judiciary has not provided
the principal impetus for the proposed change, there has been some judicial recognition of the
advisability of a change in procedure. United States v. Fischer, 381 F.2d 509, 512 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 973 (1968).
mFED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1) states:
Sentence shall be imposed without unreasonable delay. Pending sentence the court
may commit the defendant or continue or alter the bail. Before imposing sentence the
court shall afford counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant and shall
address the defendant personally and ask him if he wishes to make a statement in his
own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment.
In Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961), the Supreme Court noted that this rule had
evolved from the common law right of allocution.
"Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). However, at common law such an omission
was grounds for reversal of the penalty of attainder. Barrett, supra note 10, at 121.
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 219 (1971). Mr. Justice Douglas, however, feels that
it is already settled that allocution is a "constitutional right-the right to speak to the issues
touching on sentencing before one's fate is sealed." Id. at 238 (dissenting opinion); accord, State
v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 126 S.E.2d 126 (1962).
In McGautha, the Supreme Court held that allowing capital juries absolute discretion, uncon-
trolled by any standards, does not violate due process of law. However, because juries decide
sentences only on evidence which has been introduced in open court, subject to control by proce-
dural rules and traditional due process safeguards, the situation does not present the same problems
as sentencing by a trial judge, who is not restrained in what information he may consider in his
determination of sentence. For a discussion of McGautha, see Note, Criminal Procedure-Capital
Sentencing by a Standardless Jury, 50 N.C.L. REv. 118 (1971).
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the adversary system to bring out the facts; the impartiality of a judge
has not been considered sufficient to ensure adequate investigation.'
But as the sentencing stage of the criminal trial evolved, the impartiality
of the sentencing judge became the only safeguard for the defendant.
The convicted defendant might have a constitutional right to be present
and to make a statement before sentence is pronounced, and he defi-
nitely has the right to be represented by counsel at sentencing and to be
sentenced on the basis of accurate information. However, without the
appropriate procedural safeguards, these rights are nothing more than
hollow promises of justice. Can the impartiality of the judge assure the
defendant the right not to be sentenced on the basis of inaccurate infor-
mation? The usual answer to this question has been that disclosure and
the right to rebut any adverse charges would provide the defendant with
the necessary safeguards.3 1 In Weston, the defendant denied the allega-
tions, but the trial judge ruled that unless she could refute the charges
with factual information, he had no alternative but to accept them as
true.38 The appellate court recognized that the procedure in the trial
court allowed narcotics agents to accuse a convicted defendant of a
second and more serious crime, presenting as evidence only the "unveri-
fied statements of a faceless informer," knowing that the defendant
would have the burden of disproving the charge.39 The court asserted
that to burden the defendant with this difficult task of "proving a nega-
tive" would be a "great miscarriage of justice."4
The Weston court's primary concern seemed to be that the judicial
system has a duty to ensure that every defendant is treated according
to the broad requirement of fundamental fairness. The court asserted
that "[a] rational penal system must have some concern for the probable
accuracy of the informational imputs in the sentencing process."'" In
effect, the Weston court held that the trial judge had abused his discre-
tion by basing the sentence on information of little probative value.4"
"The one notable exception to this has been by necessity in the issuance of search warrants
by a magistrate.
3See Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1291
(1952).
"The trial judge also informed defendant's counsel that pursuant to rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, if within 120 days after imposition of sentence facts were submitted
that contradicted the charges in the presentence report, the sentence could be modified. 448 F.2d
at 629.
-"Id. at 631.
11Id. at 634.
11/d.
12Although the court never actually said that the trial judge had abused his discretion, this is
the only logical implication of the holding.
[Vol. 50
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The holding in Weston seems to be grounded in the proposition that this
abuse of discretion resulted in a denial of due process.43 Some support
for this proposition is found in Williams, in which the Court recognized
that "[leaving a sentencing judge free to avail himself of out-of-court
information in making such a fateful choice of sentence does secure to
him a broad discretionary power, one susceptible of abuse,"" and im-
plied that such an abuse would be a violation of due process.45 Although
appellate courts readily recognize that a trial judge can abuse his discre-
tion in sentencing, 6 only rarely is this indicated by anything other than
dicta. In Weston the court recognized that the safeguard of voluntary
disclosure is largely illusory and attempted to set up a standard to
ensure that sentences are based on accurate information that is proba-
tive of some assertion relevant to sentencing.
The requirement established by the Weston court to ensure that this
discretion is not abused is that information used to support a present-
ence recommendation must "be persuasive of the validity of the charges
there made. 4 8 This rather vague standard becomes clearer when read
in conjunction with the court's pointed comparison of the information
in the confidential report with a valid search or arrest warrant.49 Appar-
ently the Weston court has suggested that the trial judge should apply
a probable cause test to the presentence report. Certain similarities
between an affidavit for issuance of a warrant and a presentence report
easily lead to such an analysis. Both frequently are based on information
from informers or on other unsworn statements. Both can be based on
evidence not legally competent in a criminal trial.5 Hearsay can be the
11448 F.2d at 632. The court's citation of Townsend as precedent for its decision and the
general language used indicating the unfairness of the procedure followed in the trial court leads
to the conclusion that Weston is based on the due process clause.
"337 U.S. at 251.
1Id. at 251-52.
"See. e.g., Welch v. United States, 371 F.2d 287, 294 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 957
(1966) (dictum).
"7But see United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971) (imposition of uniform
sentences for all violators of draft orders is abuse of discretion).
"448 F.2d at 634.
UId. at 631. The court said:
[The conviction] is followed by a determination, based on unsworn evidence detailing
otherwise unverified statements of a faceless informer that would not even support a
search warrant or an arrest, and without any of the constitutional safeguards, that
Weston is probably guilty of additional and far more serious crimes, for which she is
then given an additional sentence of fifteen years.
Id.
'Compare Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311 (1959), with Williams v. New York,
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basis for the issuance of a warrant just as it can be the basis for a trial
judge's determination of sentence."' And just as reviewing courts have
been directed to pay deference to the determination of probable cause
by a magistrate, appellate courts overrule the discretion of the trial
judge in sentencing only when there has been a gross abuse of discre-
tion.52 Both are used in stages of the judicial process in which a trial-
type hearing complete with standard rules of evidence and all the tradi-
tional due process safeguards would be either impossible or highly im-
practical." Perhaps the most important similarity is the imperative
need for standards to govern both the issuance of warrants and the use
of presentence reports at sentencing. The fourth amendment has sup-
plied the basic standard of probable cause to guard against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and the Supreme Court has interpreted what this
standard requires in situations such as in the use of hearsay. 4 The
Weston decision suggests that the same standard should be used at
sentencing.
The problem with setting this type of standard is that enforcement
falls on the overburdened appellate courts. Although appellate courts
traditionally have not reviewed the probative value of information used
in sentencing, the appellate court does have a corresponding role in the
guilt determination stage of the criminal trial. 5 The Supreme Court in
In re Winship5 held that the due process clause requires that an accused
be criminally convicted only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. Although the stan-
dard of proof necessary to allow use of information in sentencing is not
as high, the principle is the same.
Federal appellate courts have no authority to undertake substantive
337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949). But there are limits to what can be considered, It would be a denial of
due process for the trial judge to determine sentence on the basis of an alleged confession the
constitutional admissibility of which has not been established. United States ex rel Brown v.
Rundle, 417 F.2d 282, 285 (3d Cir. 1969).
5'Compare Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 272 (1960), with Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241, 250 (1949).
52Compare Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1960), with United States v. Daniels,
446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971).
OSee Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
4An affidavit must meet certain requirements before a warrant will be issued on the basis of
information from an informer. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415-19 (1969).
"Some support for review of the probative value of information used in sentencing is found
in Arciniega v. Freeman, 92 S. Ct. 22 (1971) (per curiam), in which the Court decided that
petitioner's parole status had been revoked without "satisfactory evidence."
56397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
[Vol. 50
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review of sentences so long as the sentence falls within the statutory
limits.57 The majority of the Weston court said that its review was
justified because "[t]here is a difference between reviewing a sentence
and deciding that certain types of information should not, for various
reasons, be considered in sentencing."5 In support of the procedure
chosen-vacating the sentence and remanding with instructions to disre-
gard the objectionable information-the court cited several cases as
precedents.
In Verdugo v. United States,59 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that when evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights is
used in sentencing, the case would be remanded for resentencing without
considering the evidence so obtained. Tucker v. United States,'" another
Ninth Circuit case and one that was subsequently affirmed by the Su-
preme Court, held that in determining sentence the trial judge could not
consider prior uncounseled convictions invalid under Gideon v.
Wainwright.' These cases set rules that a trial judge can easily follow
without the necessity of extensive appellate court involvement. How-
ever, the Weston decision virtually demands appellate review of every
case in which a presentence report is used. In Weston the trial judge
examined the supporting information apparently in a manner similar to
that which would be required under the probable cause standards, but
the appellate court differed in its estimation of the probative value of
the information. The dissenting judge may be correct in his assertion
that the majority is making an end run around the cases barring review
of sentences and thus opening up Pandora's box on procedure at sent-
encing. 2 But the real question is not whether such a procedure goes
against precedent or will be burdensome; rather, it is whether fundamen-
tal fairness requires such a result.
57Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (dictum); accord, Gurera v. United States,
40 F.2d 338, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1930). But see United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960),
which some commentators feel may signal a penological revolution in the federal appellate courts.
Wiley is discussed in Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive
Sentences, 15 VAND. L. REv. 671, 683-84 (1962). Presumably, however, this rule would not prevent
review of a sentence on the grounds of a violation of the eighth amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.
"1448 F.2d at 631.
51402 F.2d 599, 610-13 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 961 (1971). Contra, United
States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971).
90431 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1970), affd, 92 S. Ct. 589 (1972).
61372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6448 F.2d at 634 (dissenting opinion).
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Perhaps the Bill of Rights does not provide safeguards at sentenc-
ing, but in the late eighteenth century, no safeguards were needed. At
that time, sentences were fixed for the crime, not individualized by the
sentencing judge to fit the defendant. Today the convicted defendant
needs protection from mistakes and arbitrary and capricious action
during sentencing just as much as the accused during trial. In a sector
of the judicial process in which the stakes for society and the defendant
are so high as they are at sentencing, and in which procedural safeguards
are inadequate, there is a strong case for developing a body of substan-
tive standards to ensure that sentences are not based on inaccurate
assumptions of little probative value. Disclosure of the presentence re-
port and opportunity to rebut adverse charges is certainly a safeguard
that should be guaranteed to the criminal defendant. However, as
Weston has shown, that alone is not sufficient. Perhaps the best solution
would be to provide for an appellate system to review sentences of all
defendants. Short of such a radical change, however, the solution of the
Weston court may provide a viable alternative.
MARVIN ALLEN BETHUNE
Professional Responsibility- Covenants Not To Compete Between At-
torneys
A, a lawyer, wishes to hire X, another lawyer, to workfor him in a
small town in western North Carolina. Because the town is small, A
would like somehow to ensure that X will not later leave his employment
and set up a competing practice in the same community. A most likely
will ask X to agree in writing not to practice law in the town for one
year after the termination of employment. X, understanding A's
position and intending to leave the town after a few years anyway,
agrees. Whether or not this is a common situation in this state or around
the country, it appears that this would be a reasonable approach to the
problem provided the lawyers have a full understanding of their con-
tract. However, according to the Council of the North Carolina State
Bar, A, and probably X, is guilty of unethical conduct.
On October 21, 1971, the Council responded to two inquries related
to the problem of A and X:
(1) Is it unethical for an attorney employing another attorney to
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